We study confidentiality enforcement in ontologies under the Controlled Query Evaluation framework, where a policy specifies the sensitive information and a censor ensures that query answers that may compromise the policy are not returned. We focus on censors that ensure confidentiality while maximising information access, and consider both Datalog and the OWL 2 profiles as ontology languages.
Introduction
As semantic technologies are becoming increasingly mature, there is a need for mechanisms to ensure that confidential data is only accessible by authorised users.
Controlled Query Evaluation (CQE) is a prominent confidentiality enforcement framework, in which sensitive information is declaratively specified by means of a policy and confidentiality is enforced by a censor. When given a query, a censor checks whether returning the answer may lead to a policy violation, in which case it returns a distorted answer. The CQE framework was introduced in [Sicherman et al., 1983] , and studied in [Biskup and Bonatti, 2001; Biskup and Bonatti, 2004; Bonatti et al., 1995; Biskup and Weibert, 2008] for propositional databases. It has been recently extended to ontologies, where different formalisations have been proposed [Bonatti and Sauro, 2013; Cuenca Grau et al., 2013; Studer and Werner, 2014] .
We study CQE for ontologies that are expressed in the rule language Datalog as well as in the lightweight description logics (DLs) underpinning the standadised profiles of OWL 2 [Motik et al., 2012] . We assume that data is hidden, and users access the system by a query interface. An ontology, which is known to users, provides the vocabulary and background knowledge needed for users to formulate queries, as well as to enrich query answers with implicit information. Policies, formalised as conjunctive queries, are available only to system administrators, but not to ordinary users. The role of the censor is to preserve confidentiality by filtering out those answers to user queries that could lead to a policy violation. In this setting, there is a danger that confidentiality enforcement may over-restrict the access of the user. Thus, we focus on optimal censors, which maximise answers to queries while ensuring confidentiality of the policy.
We are especially interested in censors that can be realised by off-the-shelf reasoning infrastructure. To fullfil this requirement, we introduce in Section 4 view and obstruction censors. View censors return only answers that follow from the ontology and an anonymised dataset (a view) where some occurrences of constants may have been replaced with labelled nulls. The censor answers faithfully all queries against the view; thus, any information not captured by the view is inaccessible by default. View censors may require materialisation of implicit data, and hence are well-suited for applications where materialisation is feasible. Obstruction censors are defined by a set of "forbidden query patterns" (an obstruction), where all answers instantiating such patterns are not returned to users. These censors do not require data modification and are well-suited for applications such as Ontology Based Data Access (OBDA), where data is managed by an RDBMS. Obstruction censors are dual to view censors in the sense that they specify the information that users are denied access to. We formally characterise this duality, and show that their capabilities are incomparable.
In Section 5 we investigate the limitations of view censors and show that checking existence of an optimal view is undecidable for Datalog ontologies. We then study fragments of Datalog for which optimal views always exist and extend our results to OWL 2 profile ontologies. In Section 6 we focus on obstruction censors, and provide sufficient and necessary conditions for an optimal censor to exist. Then, we propose a tractable algorithm for computing optimal obstruction censors for linear Datalog ontologies and apply our results to OWL 2 QL ontologies.
Preliminaries
We adopt standard notions in first order logic over functionfree finite signatures. Our focus is on ontologies, so we assume signatures with predicates of arity at most two. We treat equality ≈ as an ordinary predicate, but assume that any set of formulae containing ≈ also contains all the axioms of ≈ for its signature.
Datasets and Ontologies A dataset is a finite set of facts (i.e., 
ground atoms). An ontology is a finite set of rules, that
(1) A(x)∧R(x, y1)∧B(y1)∧R(x, y2)∧B(y2) → y1 ≈ y2, (2) R(x, y) → S(x, y), (3) A(x) → ∃y.[R(x, y)∧B(y)], (4) A(x) → x ≈ a, (5) R(x, y)∧S(y, z) → T (x, z), (6) A(x)∧B(x) → C(x), (7) A(x) ∧ R(x, y) → B(y), (8) R(x, y) → S(y, x), (9) R(x, a) → B(x), (10) R(x, y) → A(y), (11) A(x) → R(x, a), (12) A(x) → B(x), (13) R(x, y) ∧ B(y) → A(x). where the body ϕ( x) and the head ψ( x, y) are conjunctions of atoms, and variables x are implicitly universally quantified.
We restrict ourselves to ontologies O and datasets D such that O ∪D is satisfiable, which ensures that answers to queries are meaningful. A rule is -Datalog if the head has a single atom and y is empty; -guarded if the body has an atom (guard) with all x; -linear if the body has a single atom; -multi-linear if the body contains only guards; -tree-shaped if the undirected multigraph with an edge {t 1 , t 2 } for each binary body atom R(t 1 , t 2 ) is a tree. An ontology is of a type above if so are all the rules in it. OWL 2 Profiles Table 1 provides the types of rules sufficient to capture the axioms in the OWL 2 RL, EL, and QL profiles. We treat the concept in DLs as a unary predicate and assume that each ontology contains the rule S( x) → (x) for each predicate S and variable x from x. An ontology consisting of rules in Table 1 is -RL if it has no rules of type (3); -QL if it only has rules of types (2), (3), (8), (10), (12); -EL if it has no rules of types (1), (7), (8).
Queries A conjunctive query (CQ) with free variables x is a formula Q( x) of the form ∃ y.ϕ( x, y), with the body ϕ( x, y) a conjunction of atoms. A union of CQs (UCQ) is disjunction of CQs with same free variables. Queries with no free variables are Boolean. A tuple of constants a is a (certain) answer to Q( x) over ontology O and dataset D if O ∪ D |= Q( a). The set of answers to Q( x) over O and D is denoted by cert(Q, O, D).
Basic Framework
We assume that data D is hidden while the ontology O is known to all users. It is assumed that system administrators are in charge of specifying policies as CQs, and that policies are assigned to users by standard mechanisms such as rolebased access control [Sandhu et al., 1996] . Definition 1. A CQE instance I is a triple (O, D, P ), with O an ontology, D a dataset, and P a CQ, which is called policy. The instance I is Datalog, guarded, etc. if so is the ontology O ∪ {ϕ( x, y) → A p ( x)}, where ϕ( x, y) is the body of P and A p a fresh predicate.
Example 2. Consider the following ontology and dataset that describe an excerpt of a social network:
Here, the ontology O ex states, for example, that people who like thrillers are thriller fans, or that friendship is a symmetric relation. Then, a policy P ex = FoF (John, x) forbids access to John's friend list. ♦ A key component of a CQE system is the censor, whose goal is to decide according to the policy which query answers can be safely returned to users. Definition 3. A censor for a CQE instance (O, D, P ) is a function cens mapping each CQ Q to a subset of cert(Q, O, D). The theory Th cens of cens is the set {Q( a) | a ∈ cens(Q) and Q( x) is a CQ}.
Censor cens is confidentiality preserving if for each tuple a of constants O ∪ Th cens |= P ( a). It is optimal if -it is confidentiality preserving, and -no confidentiality preserving censor cens = cens exists such that cens(Q) ⊆ cens (Q) for every CQ Q. Intuitively, Th cens represents all the information that a user can gather by asking CQs to the system. If the censor is confidentiality preserving, then no information can be obtained about the policy, regardless of the number of CQs asked. In this way, optimal censors maximise information accessibility without compromising the policy.
View and Obstruction Censors
The idea behind view censors is to modify the dataset by anonymising occurrences of constants as well as by adding or removing facts, whenever needed. We refer to such modified dataset as an (anonymisation) view. The censor returns only the answers that follow from the ontology and view; in this way, the main workload of the censor amounts to the computation of certain answers, which can be delegated to the query answering engine. Definition 4. A view V for I = (O, D, P ) is a dataset over the signature of I extended with a set of fresh constants. The view censor vcens V I is the function mapping each CQ Q( x) to the set cert(Q, O, D) ∩ cert(Q, O, V). The view is optimal if so is its corresponding censor.
Clearly, for the censor to be confidentiality preserving O ∪ V must not entail any answer to the policy. On the other hand, to ensure optimality a view must encode as much information from the hidden dataset as possible. Example 5. Consider the view V ex obtained from D ex by replacing Bob with a fresh an b . Intuitively, V ex is the result of "anonymising" the constant Bob, while keeping the structure of the data intact. Since V ex contains no information about Bob, we have cert(P ex , O ex , V ex ) = ∅ and the censor based on V ex is confidentiality preserving. View V ex , however, is not optimal: for instance, O ex ∪ V ex does not entail the fact Likes(Bob, Seven), which can be added to the view without violating confidentiality. ♦
The idea behind obstruction censors is to associate to a CQE instance a Boolean UCQ U s.t. the censor returns an answer a to a CQ Q( x) only if no CQ in U follows from Q( a). Thus, the obstruction can be seen as a set of forbidden query patterns, which should not be disclosed.
Definition 6. An obstruction U for I = (O, D, P ) is a Boolean UCQ. The obstruction censor ocens U I based on U is the function that maps each CQ Q( x) to the set
The obstruction is optimal if so is its censor ocens U I . Similarly to view censors, obstruction censors do not require dedicated algorithms: checking Q( a) |= U can be delegated to an RDBMS. Obstructions can be virtually maintained and do not require data materialisation.
Example 7. The censor based on V ex from Example 5 can also be realised with the following obstruction U ex :
Intuitively, U ex "blocks" query answers involving Bob; and all other answers are the same as over O ex ∪ D ex .
♦ Examples 5 and 7 show that the same censor may be based on both a view and an obstruction. These censors, however, behave dually: a view explicitly encodes the information accessible to users, whereas obstructions specify information which users are denied access to. It is not obvious whether (and how) a view can be realised by an obstruction, or viceversa. We next focus on Datalog ontologies and characterise when a view V and obstruction U yield the same censor. We start with few definitions.
Each Datalog ontology O and dataset D have a unique least Herbrand model H O,D : a finite structure satisfying a ∈ cert(Q, O, D) iff H O,D |= Q( a) for every CQ Q. Thus, this model captures all the information relevant to CQ answering. A natural specification of the duality between views and obstructions is then as follows: U and V implement the same censor if and only if U captures the structures not homomorphically embeddable into H O,V . To formalise this statement, we recall the central problem in the (non-uniform) constraint satisfaction theory. and Vardi, 2008) . Let C be a class of finite structures and let C be a subset of C. First-order sentence ψ defines C if I ∈ C is equivalent to I |= ψ for every structure I ∈ C.
Definition 8 (Kolaitis
Let J → J denote the fact that there is a homomorphism from a structure J to a structure J . The correspondence is given in the following theorem.
Using this theorem together with definability results in Finite Model Theory, we can show that views and obstructions cannot simulate one another in general.
Theorem 10. There is a Datalog CQE instance admitting a confidentiality preserving view censor that is not based on any obstruction. Conversely, there is a Datalog CQE instance admitting a confidentiality preserving obstruction censor that is not based on any view.
Optimal View Censors
Our discussion in Section 4 suggests that view and obstruction censors must be studied independently. In this section we focus on view censors and start by establishing their theoretical limitations. The following example shows that optimal view censors may not exist, even if we restrict ourselves to empty ontologies. Example 11. Consider a CQE instance with empty ontology, dataset consisting of a fact R(a, a), and policy P = ∃x ∃y ∃z.R(x, y) ∧ R(y, z) ∧ R(z, x). Consider also the family of Boolean CQs Q n = ∃x 1 . . . ∃x n . i<j R(x i , x j ), which intuitively represent strict total orders on n elements. Answering these queries positively is harmless: V ∪ {Q n } n≥1 |= P for any confidentiality preserving view V. Assume now that V is optimal, and let m be the number of constants in V. Then, V |= Q m+1 since otherwise V would encode a self-loop and violate the policy. This contradicts the optimality of V, and hence no optimal view exists. ♦ Furthermore, determining the existence of an optimal view is undecidable even for Datalog CQE instances. Theorem 12. The problem of checking whether a Datalog CQE instance admits an optimal view is undecidable.
Proof (idea).
The proof is by reduction to the undecidable problem of checking whether a deterministic Turing machine without a final state has a repeated configuration in a run on the empty tape. For each such machine we construct a CQE instance such that the run corresponds to an infinite grid-like "view" with axes for the tape and time. The ontology guarantees that representations of adjacent configurations agree with the transition function, and the policy forbids invalid configurations (e.g., with many symbols in a cell). Coinciding configurations appear in the run iff the grid can be "folded" to a finite view on all sides (e.g., if configurations can be merged).
In what follows, we identify classes of CQE instances that guarantee existence of optimal view censors. We start by studying restrictions on Datalog ontologies and then adapt the obtained results to the OWL 2 profiles.
Guarded Tree-Shaped Datalog
The idea behind view censors is to anonymise information in the original data in such a way that the policy cannot be violated. For instance, in Example 5 we substituted the atom FoF (John, Bob) with FoF (John, an b ), where an b is a fresh constant that is an anonymised copy of Bob. In general, however, many such anonymous copies may be required for each data constant to encode all the information required for ensuring optimality. The limit case is illustrated by Example 11, where no finite number of fresh constants suffices for optimality. Observe that the CQE instance used in Example 11 is neither guarded nor tree-shaped due to the form of the policy. In what follows, we show that an optimal view can always be constructed using at most exponentially many anonymous constants if we restrict ourselves to Datalog CQE instances that are guarded and tree-shaped.
We next provide an intuitive idea of the construction. Consider the view for a CQE instance (O, D, P ) consisting of the following three components V 1 -V 3 .
(1) Component V 1 is any maximal set of unary atoms in H O,D that does not compromise the policy. (2) To construct V 2 , we consider an anonymised copy a B of each constant a and each set B of unary predicates B s.t.
The corresponding set of all unary atoms B(a B ) for B ∈ B is a part of V 2 if and only if it is "safe", that is, neither discloses the policy nor entail new facts together with O ∪ V 1 . (3) Finally, V 3 consists of a maximal set of binary atoms on all the constants (including the copies) that are justified by H O,D and do not disclose the policy. Optimality of this view follows immediately from the construction. The view, however, may require exponentially many anonymised copies of data constants. The need for them is illustrated by the following example. Example 13. Consider the CQE instance with ontology consisting of rules ThrFan(x)→MovFan(x) and ThrFan(y)∧FoF (x, y) → MovFan(x), dataset consisting of facts FoF (John, Bob), ThrFan(John) and ThrFan(Bob), and policy MovFan(x). The essential part of the optimal view obtained using the aforementioned construction is given in Figure 1 . Here V 1 = ∅, V 2 contains unary atoms over the anonymised copies John {MovFan} and John {MovFan,ThrFan} of John, and Bob {MovFan,ThrFan} of Bob, while V 3 contains the FoF atoms represented by arrows. Note that at least two anonymised copies of John are necessary in any optimal view to answer correctly "harmless" queries such as ∃x ∃y ∃z.
This example shows that, in order to avoid the exponential blow up in the number of anonymised copies, we need further restrictions on the ontology. In particular, in the case of multi-linear CQE instances we can guarantee that just one copy suffices for every constant.
The following theorem formalises the intuition above. Theorem 14. Let I be a Datalog tree-shaped CQE instance. If I is guarded, it admits an optimal view that can be computed in time exponential in |I| and polynomial in data size.
If I is multi-linear, it admits an optimal view that can be computed in time polynomial in |I|. Additionally, I has a unique optimal censor if it is linear.
OWL 2 Profiles
The result in Theorem 14 is immediately applicable to RL ontologies, with the only restriction that they do not contain rules of types (1), (4), or (5) The following proposition provides the mechanism to reduce optimal view computation for arbitrary ontologies to the case of Datalog. Proposition 16. Let I = (O, D, P ) be a CQE instance over constants σ with P tree-shaped, and
With this proposition at hand, we just need to devise a technique for rewriting any QL (or guarded EL) ontology into a stronger Datalog ontology, which, however, preserves the answers to all tree-shaped queries. To this end, we exploit techniques developed for the so-called combined approach to query answering [Kontchakov et al., 2011; Lutz et al., 2009; Lutz et al., 2013; Stefanoni et al., 2013] . The idea is to transform rules of type (3) into Datalog by Skolemising existentially quantified variables into globally fresh constants. Such transformation strengthens the ontology; however, if applied to a QL or guarded EL ontology, it preserves answers to treeshaped CQs for any dataset over σ [Stefanoni et al., 2013] . Definition 17. Let O be an ontology and σ be a set of constants. The ontology
where R is a fresh binary predicate, uniquely associated to the original rule, and a is a globally fresh constant not from σ, uniquely associated to A and R.
Theorem 18. For any ontology
Proposition 16 and Theorem 18 ensure that H Ξσ(O),V is an optimal view for I whenever V is such a view for I = (Ξ σ (O), D, P ). The transformation of O to Ξ σ (O) preserves linearity, guardedness, and tree-shapedness, so the results of Section 5.1 are applicable to I . Theorem 19. Every guarded EL CQE instance admits an optimal view that can be computed in exponential time. Every QL instance admits a unique optimal censor, which is implementable by a view of polynomial size.
Optimal Obstruction Censors
Similarly to Section 5, we start the study of optimal obstruction censors with its limitations. The following example shows that such a censor may not exist even if we restrict ourselves to ontologies with only one rule. Example 20. Consider a CQE instance with ontology {R(x, y)∧A(y) → A(x)}, dataset {R(a, a), A(a)}, and policy A(a). Let Q n , n > 0, be a family of Boolean CQs
With the help of the ontology each of Q n discloses the policy. Thus, each Q n should entail a Boolean CQ in any optimal obstruction. Consider the set of all CQs that are entailed by queries Q n but not equivalent to any of them. On the one hand, this set is "harmless", than is, any obstruction censor should answer all these queries positively. On the other hand, the CQs Q n do not entail each other. Hence, any optimal obstruction should contain a CQ equivalent to each Q n , which is however not possible, because n is unbounded. ♦ We leave the question of decidability of checking the existence of an optimal obstruction for a CQE instance open. Answering this question positively would imply a solution to a long-standing open problem. In Appendix C we provide a reduction from the problem of uniform boundedness for binary Datalog, for which the decidability is unknown [Marcinkowski, 1999] , to the existence problem of optimal obstructions for Datalog CQE instances. In the rest of the section we give a characterisation of optimal obstructions for Datalog instances in terms of resolution proofs and identify restrictions for which the characterisation guarantees existence of such obstructions.
Characterisation of Optimal Obstructions
We first recall the standard notion of SLD resolution.
A goal is a conjunction of atoms. An SLD resolution step takes a goal β ∧ ϕ with a selected atom β and a sentence r that is either a Datalog rule ψ → δ or a fact δ, and produces a new goal ϕθ ∧ ψθ, where θ is a most general unifier of β and δ (assuming that ψ is empty in the case when r is a fact). An (SLD) proof of a goal G 0 in a Datalog ontology O and dataset D is a sequence of goals G 0 , G 1 , . . . , G n , where G n is empty, and each G i is obtained from G i−1 and a sentence (rule or fact) in O ∪ D by an SLD resolution step.
Resolution is sound and complete: for any Datalog ontology O, dataset D, and goal G (such that O ∪ D is satisfiable) there is a proof of G in O and D if and only if O ∪ D |= ∃ * G for the existential closure ∃ * G of G. We next characterise optimal obstructions using SLD proofs. Intuitively, if an obstruction censor answers positively sufficient number of Boolean CQs ∃ * G for goals G in a proof of a policy, then a user could reconstruct (a part of) this proof and compromise the policy. Also, there can be many proofs, and a user may compromise the policy by reconstructing any of them. Thus, to ensure that a censor is confidentiality preserving, we must guarantee that the obstruction contains enough CQs to prevent reconstruction of any proof. If we also want the censor to be optimal, the obstruction should not block too many CQs. As we will see later on, these requirements may be in conflict and lead to an infinite "obstruction". Next definitions formalise this intuition. Definition 21. Let I = (O, D, P ) be a Datalog CQE instance, Q be the set of all Boolean CQs ∃ * G for goals G in proofs of P ( a) in O and D for some tuple of constants a, and S be a maximal subset of Q such that O ∪ S |= P ( a) for any a. Then, a pseudo-obstruction for I is a subset of Q \ S that contains a CQ Q for any Q in Q \ S with Q |= Q .
The next theorem establishes the connection between pseudo-obstructions and optimality. Theorem 22. Let I be a Datalog CQE instance. 1. If Υ is a finite pseudo-obstruction for I, then Q∈Υ Q is an optimal obstruction for I. 2. If each pseudo-obstruction for I is infinite, then no optimal obstruction censor for I exists.
This theorem has implications on the expressive power of obstructions. In particular, we can now extend the result in Theorem 10, which applies to censors that are not necessarily optimal, to capture also optimality. Theorem 23. There is a CQE instance, which is both RL and EL, admitting an optimal view, but no optimal obstruction. Conversely, there exists an RL CQE instance that admits an optimal obstruction, but no optimal view.
Linear Datalog and QL
We now show how to apply resolution-based techniques to compute optimal obstructions for linear Datalog CQE instances and then adapt the results to QL. In fact, we can guarantee not only existence of optimal obstructions for such instances, but also uniqueness and polynomiality of corresponding censors.
Our solution for linear Datalog instances is based on the computation of the set Q of existential closures of goals in the proofs of policies. However, since all the rules in the ontology are linear and the body of the policy is an atom (recall that the rule corresponding to the policy should be linear as well), each of these goals consists of a single atom, except the last goal in each proof, which is empty. There are only polynomial number of such atoms (up to renaming of variables). So, all the proofs can be represented by a single finite proof graph with atoms and the empty conjunction (denoted by ) as nodes, and SLD resolution steps as edges. This is illustrated by the following example. Example 24. Consider a CQE instance with ontology {Likes(x, y)→Movie(y), Likes(x, y)→MovFan(x)}, dataset Likes(John, Seven), and policy MovFan(John). A fragment of the proof graph is given in Figure 2 . ♦ Using proof graphs we can compute optimal censors. Theorem 25. Let I = (O, D, P ) be a linear Datalog CQE instance, and let S be the set of all nodes in the proof graph of O∪D on the paths from facts P ( a) with any tuple of constants a to . Then, the Boolean UCQ
is an optimal obstruction computable in polynomial time, and ocens U I is the unique optimal censor for I. Example 26. For the instance in Example 24 there is only one path in the proof graph from the policy to , and S = {MovFan(John), Likes(John, y), }. Thus, movieF an(John) ∨ ∃y.Likes(John, y) is optimal. ♦ Finally, note that the transformation of a QL ontology O to an RL ontology Ξ σ (O) given in Definition 17, preserves linearity of rules. Hence, Proposition 18 with Theorem 25 yield the following result.
Theorem 27. Every QL CQE instance admits a unique optimal censor based on an obstruction that can be computed in polynomial time.
Related Work
The formal study of privacy in databases has received significant attention. CQE for propositional databases with complete information has been studied in [Sicherman et al., 1983; Bonatti et al., 1995; Biskup and Bonatti, 2001; Biskup and Bonatti, 2004] . CQE was extended to (propositional) incomplete databases in [Biskup and Weibert, 2008] . Miklau and Suciu (2007) studied perfect privacy. Perfect privacy, however, is very strict and may preclude publishing of any meaningful information when extended to ontologies [Cuenca Grau and Horrocks, 2008] . View-based authorisation was investigated in [Rizvi et al., 2004; Zhang and Mendelzon, 2005] , and Deutsch and Papakonstantinou (2005) analysed the implications to privacy derived from publishing database views.
Privacy in the context of ontologies is a growing area of research. Information hiding at the schema level was studied in [Konev et al., 2009; Cuenca Grau and Motik, 2012] . Data privacy for EL and ALC DLs was investigated in [Stouppa and Studer, 2007; Tao et al., 2010] , and the notion of a privacy-preserving reasoner was introduced in [Bao et al., 2007] . Calvanese et al. (2012) extended the view-based authorisation framework by Zhang and Mendelzon (2005) to DL ontologies.
An early work on non-propositional CQE is [Biskup and Bonatti, 2007] . CQE for ontologies has been studied in [Cuenca Grau et al., 2013; Bonatti and Sauro, 2013; Studer and Werner, 2014] . We extend Cuenca Grau et al.
(2013) with a wide range of new results: (i) we consider arbitrary CQs as policies rather than just ground facts; (ii) we introduce obstruction censors, compare their expressive power with that of view censors, characterise their optimality, and show how to compute obstructions for linear Datalog and QL ontologies; (iii) we show undecidability of checking existence of an optimal view censor and provide algorithms for guarded Datalog and all the OWL 2 profiles. We see our work as complementary to Bonatti and Sauro (2013) and Studer and Werner (2014) . The former focuses on situations where attackers have access to external sources of background knowledge; they identify additional vulnerabilities and propose solutions within the CQE framework. The latter focuses on meta-properties of general censors that, in contrast to ours, can also provide unsound answers or refuse queries.
Conclusions
We studied CQE in the context of ontologies. Our results provide insights on the fundamental tradeoff between accessibility and confidentiality of information. Moreover, they yield a flexible way for system designers to ensure selective access to data. In particular, we proposed tractable view based solutions for CQE instances with tree-shaped and linear Datalog and QL ontologies, and tractable obstruction based solutions for linear Datalog and QL ontologies. Our solutions can be implemented using off-the-shelf query answering infrastructure and provide a starting point for CQE system development.
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A.1 Proofs for Section 4
Before proving Theorem 9 we present the following notation and a lemma. Let I be a finite structure and f a function associating a fresh variable to each domain element of I. The query Q I for I is the Boolean CQ defined as follows, with R 1 , . . . R n the predicates interpreted by I:
Given a BCQ Q, denote [Q] the structure interpreting each R, occurring in Q, with (f (u 1 ), . . . f (u n )) for every atom R(u 1 , . . . , u n ) in Q, where f maps each constant in Q to itself and each variable y to a fresh constant d y .
Lemma 28. Let J be a finite structure and let C be a class of finite structures. Then, the following holds:
Proof. Let I ∈ C be such that I → J ; clearly, I |= Q I and hence I |= K∈C,K →J Q K , as required. Conversely, assume that I ∈ C is such that I |= K∈C,K →J Q K ; then, there exists K such that K ∈ C, K → J and I |= Q K . The latter implies that K → I and hence we can deduce I → J , as required (otherwise, we would have by composition of homomorphisms that K → J , which is a contradiction).
Then, for each I ∈ C we have that I → H O,V iff I |= U . By Lemma 28, the following holds for each I ∈ C:
Let Q( x) be a CQ, and let t ∈ cert(Q, O, D), which implies that Theorem 10. There is a Datalog CQE instance admitting a confidentiality preserving view censor that is not based on any obstruction. Conversely, there is a Datalog CQE instance admitting a confidentiality preserving obstruction censor that is not based on any view. Proof . First we illustrate that obstruction censors cannot always simulate view censors. Consider CQE instance I = (∅, D, ∅), where D represents an undirected graph with nodes "green" g and "blue" b, which are connected by edge in all possible ways:
Clearly, D entails every Boolean CQ over the edge relation and thus every graph can be homomorphically embedded into D. Consider V = {edge(g, b), edge(b, g)}. Since the ontology is empty, H ∅,V = V and {I | I is finite, I → H O,D , and I → V} is the class of all graphs that are not 2-colourable. It is well-known that this class of graphs is not first-order definable and hence cannot be captured by a UCQ.
Next we construct an obstruction censor which cannot be simulated by a view censor. Consider the instance I = (O, D, ∅), where D = {edge(a, a)} and O consists of the single transitivity rule edge(x, y) ∧ edge(y, z) → edge(x, z).
Clearly, O ∪ D entails each Boolean CQ over the edge relation. Consider obstruction U = ∃y.edge(y, y), which defines the class of directed graphs with self loops. Suppose that some view V realises ocens U I . By Theorem 9, the obstruction U must define {I ∈ C | I → H O,V } where C is the class of all directed graphs. Thus, any graph G must satisfy the property G has no self loops iff G → H O,V .
Due to the rule in O, we conclude that V is a DAG, that is, it has no edge-loops. Take a DAG G extending (a graph isomorphic to) H O,V with a new node v and edges connecting all its sink nodes to v. Clearly G has no self loops, but G → H O,V , which is a contradiction.
A.2 Proofs for Section 5
Theorem 12. The problem of checking whether a Datalog CQE instance admits an optimal view is undecidable.
Proof. The proof is by reduction from the following problem: does a deterministic Turing machine without a final state have a repeated configuration? This problem is undecidable by Rice's Theorem.
Formally, for every such Turing machine M = (Γ, Q, q 0 , δ) with Γ a tape alphabet, which include the blank symbol 0, Q a set of states, q 0 ∈ Q an initial state, and δ : Γ × Q → Γ × (Q \ {q 0 }) × {+, −} a transition function, we construct an Datalog CQE instance I M = (O, D, P ) such that it admits an optimal view if and only if M starting on the empty tape has a repeated configuration. The notion of configuration is as usual-it is the content of the tape and the head pointer to a cell on the tape. Note that the transition function δ is defined is such a way that the initial state does not appear in a computation anywhere except the initial configuration. This clearly does not affect the undecidability of the problem. We also assume, that the tape of the machine is infinite in both directions, and all of it can freely be used for computations.
We start the construction of I M from the dataset D. It uses only one constant a and consists of three binary atoms
R(a, a), S(a, a), T (a, a).
The predicate T is intended to point to the next cell on the tape, the predicate S points to the same cell in the following configuration, and the predicate R is responsible for initialisation. We start the definition of the ontology O with the description of the role of R. Let O contain rules
As we will see formally later, these rules guarantee that if I M admits an optimal view, then this view contains the fact I(a). This fact initialises the tape by means of the following rules (conjunction in heads is just a syntactic sugar):
In these rules C q0 is a unary predicate indicating that the head is pointing to the first cell and the state is q 0 . For each other state q in Q the vocabulary contains the corresponding predicate C q . The rest of the tape should always be marked by predicates C ∅ indicating that the head does not point to this cell. Similarly, if in some configuration a cell contains an alphabet symbol g ∈ Γ, then this is indicated by the predicate A g ; for example, the rules above ensure that the tape is initialised by the symbol 0. To ensure the consistency of the computation grid, constructed by means of tape and time predicates T and S, the ontology contains the rules
Finally, we need to make the adjacent configurations consistent. In particular, the content of each cell, as well as the fact that the head is pointing to this cell in some particular state, that is, the cell's C q and A g labels, is completely defined by the labels of the three cells in the previous configuration. So, abbreviating
Having the ontology defined, we complete the construction with specifying the policy. It consists of several BCQs, but the translation to a single CQ by means of several rules in the ontology is straightforward. The policy P guarantees that a cell cannot contain several alphabet symbols, the machine cannot be in several states, and the head cannot simultaneously point and not point to a cell. This is formalised as the following set of BCQs:
Completed the construction, next we formally prove that M has a repeated configuration if and only if I M has a (finite) optimal view. We start with forward direction.
(⇒)
Let the first pair of repeated configurations of M have numbers m and n, while the smallest (non-positive) number of a cell whose content was changed during the computation is k + 1, and the biggest (non-negative) such number is − 1 (we assume that initially the head is pointing to the cell number 0). Note that k and are finite, because a computation cannot use infinite number of cells in finite number of steps. In fact, k > −n and < n.
The view V makes use of constants a ij with −1 ≤ i < n and k ≤ j ≤ , such that a 00 = a and all others are anonymous copies of a. By means of binary predicates S and T these constants form a grid, that is the view contains atoms
The grid is "folded" on all the sides, in the configuration number i = −1 and cells number k and by means of self loops, and on repeated configurations m and n:
Each configuration with number 0 ≤ i < n with the word g k . . . g written on the part of the tape with cell numbers from k to , the state q, and the head pointing to the cell number h is represented by means of the following facts:
The auxiliary "configuration" number −1 is the same as a usual configuration with the empty tape, except that the head does not point anywhere:
The constant a is in the initialisation predicates: R(a, a), I(a).
Finally, each configuration with number −1 ≤ i < n (i.e., including the auxiliary one) has cells with numbers k and such that all the cells between k and k , as well as all the cells between and contain 0 and do not have the head pointing on them. the first group is marked by I − and the second by I + :
It is straightforward to see that V |= O and O ∪ V |= P , that is, V is a confidentiality preserving view for I M . Also, it is a matter of technicality to check that the view is indeed optimal.
(⇐)
Next we show that if the machine M does not have a repeated configuration, then there is no optimal view for the instance I M . Assume for the sake of contradiction that such a view V exists. Without loss of generality we may assume that V |= O. The first fact we need is the following claim.
Claim 29. The view V contains the atom I(a).
Proof. Whatever is the shape of V, it entails the BCQs Q
) for all i ≥ 1. Since i is unbounded, but V is finite, there exists i 0 such that there is a homomorphism from the body of Q R i0 to V which sends different x j and x k to the same constant. This means that there is an R-loop of some length in V, which is connected by an R-chain from a. By the rules (2)-(4) this implies that I(a) is a fact in V.
Similarly to the proof of the claim above, whatever is the shape of V, it entails the BCQs Whatever is the shape of V, it entails the BCQs Q
Since V is finite, this implies that there is the (finite) biggest number n − 1 such that the body of Q S n has a homomorphism to V which sends different x j to different constants.
Consider now a "grid" BCQ Q S,T that consists of the following atoms:
This query is also "harmless", that is, should be entailed by V whatever is its shape. Since this BCQ has a chain of S starting from a of length greater than n − 1, for any homomorphism from the body of Q S,T to V there are numbers k and such that this homomorphism sends x k0 and x 0 to the same constant. Let h be such a homomorphism, and k, be the numbers corresponding to h. By rules (8) and (9) we have that V contains atoms
On the other hand, by the fact that I(a) is in V and the rules (5)- (7) we have that the constants h(x 0j ) for −n ≤ j ≤ n represent the part of the initial configuration on cells with numbers from −n to n. Furthermore, by means of the rules corresponding to the transition function of the machine, the constants h(x ij ) form the part of the configuration with number i for all 0 < i < . By the same rules and atoms (10) we conclude that the constants h(x kj ) represent not only the part of the configuration number k, but also the part of the configuration number . If these parts are different, then this discloses the policy, so they are the same. But the rest of the configuration, that is the content of the tape beyond the cells with numbers from −n to n, is also the same for the configurations, because they are just full of symbols 0 (the head cannot reach this part of the tape because it is too far). So, we come to the fact that M has a repeated computation, which contradicts the precondition. We next focus on the optimality statement. Assume that O ∪ V ∪ {Q( t)} |= P ( s) for any s ∈ cert(P, O, D) implies that t ∈ cert(Q, O, V), while vcens V I is not optimal. Then, there is a confidentiality preserving censor cens that extends vcens V I ; this means that for some CQ Q( x) and, t ∈ cert(Q, O, D) we have t ∈ cens(Q), but t / ∈ vcens V I (Q). The fact that t / ∈ vcens V I (Q) and t ∈ cert(Q, O, D) implies that t ∈ cert(Q, O, V). Furthermore, the fact that cens is confidentiality-preserving implies that O ∪ Th cens ∪ {Q( t)} |= P ( s) for any s ∈ cert(P, O, D). But then, since cens extends vcens ∪ {Q( t)} |= P ( s), and therefore t ∈ vcens V I (Q), which is a contradiction. Finally, assume that there exists some CQ Q( x) and t ∈ cert(Q, O, D) such that O ∪ V ∪ {Q( t)} |= P ( s) for each s ∈ cert(P, O, D), but O ∪ V |= Q( t). Then, we can define a censor cens that behaves exactly like vcens we have that O ∪ Th cens |= P ( s), which implies that cens is confidentiality preserving and Th vcens V I is not optimal, as required.
We say that a rule is normalised if it has at most two atoms in its body; an ontology is normalised if it is a set of normalised rules. Clearly, any guarded ontology can be normalised. Definition 31. Let Σ be a signature, O an ontology over Σ, and a subset S of Σ is a set of unary predicates.
Theorem 14. Let I be a Datalog tree-shaped CQE instance. If I is guarded, it admits an optimal view that can be computed in time exponential in |I| and polynomial in data size. If I is multi-linear, it admits an optimal view that can be computed in time polynomial in |I|. Additionally, I has a unique optimal censor if it is linear.
Proof.
Guarded, tree-shaped CQE instance. Algorithm 1 presents a procedure that builds a view for a given CQE instance I = (O, D, P ). We are going to show that if I is tree-shaped and guarded, then the algorithm returns an optimal view for I. By its construction, the constructed dataset V is safe, so it remains to prove its optimality. Due to Proposition 30, it suffices to show that for each CQ Q and a tuple t such that t ∈ cert(Q, O, D):
Observe the following. Assume that Q( t) satisfies the "if"-clause of Equation (11). Since by the assumption t ∈ cert(Q, O, D), then there is a homomorphism h from
It is easy to see that
We are going to use the following notations.
• Denote
• Let X be a dataset and d an element occurring in X . Then we define the set conc
We are going to show the existence of a homomorphism g : B → V, which would prove that Q satisfies the "then"-clause of Equation (11). Let d 1 , . . . , d m be all the fresh constants from [Q( t)], let d be an element from [Q( t)], and let h be a homomorphism from B into H. We claim that there exists g that satisfies the following properties:
where σ a is a set of all "copies" of a introduced by the algorithm (for example, see sub-routines in Algorithm 2).
It remains to show that g does indeed exist and map B into V. To this end, we need to show that 1. for each element d from [Q( t)], there is an element a in V satisfying the second property of g, and 2. for each binary atom
The former requirement follows from the construction of V. The latter one requires that
Note that Equation 11 implies that cert(P, O E , V ∪ B) = ∅. Also observe that no rule from O E is applicable to V ∪ B. Indeed, no rule is applicable to V nor to B by construction. Assume that a rule r is applicable to V ∪ B. If the body of r contains one atom, then we immediately obtain a contradiction. If the body of r contains two atoms then there exist an atom f 1 ∈ V and an atom f 2 ∈ B such that f 1 ∧ f 2 is an instantiation of the body of r. Assume that the atom in the body of r corresponding to f 1 is a guard of the rule; then all constants occurring in f 2 occur in f 1 too. Since B and V share only "active" constants (i.e., the ones from I), we have that f 2 ∈ V ∩ B (due to Observation (O1)), and thus r is applicable to V, which gives a contradiction.
Assume that Equation 12 does not hold. Hence, there is a rule r ∈ O applicable to V ∪ g(B). Recall that r is not applicable to V. We have the following cases depending on the shape of r.
r is of the form
Clearly, in this case r is applicable to g(B). It is easy to see that r is then applicable to B since conc B (d) = conc V (g(d)) for every d in B, which contradicts the observation above. 2. r is of the form R(x, y) → Head ( x) or A ∧ R(x, y) → Head ( x), where Head ( x) is of one of the following forms for some unary C of binary Q predicate: C(x), C(y), Q(x, y), or Q(y, x). Here we obtain a contradiction similarly to the previous case.
3. r is of the form R(x, y) ∧ A(x) → Head ( x). There are three cases. 
, respectively, and thus
and ρ Q ∈ conc B (b ), and thus δ Q (g(d i )) and ρ Q (g(b )) are in V; therefore, CheckRole sub-routine of the algorithm would return True on input (Q (g(d i ), g(b ) ), V), and thus Q(g(d i ), g(b )) ∈ V. Anyway, the obtained contradictions conclude the case.
4. r is of the form R(x, y) ∧ A(y) → Head ( x). This case is analogous to the previous one.
Finally, g(f ) should be in V for each binary atom f ∈ B, since (i) Equation (12) holds and (ii) binary atoms that do not discover the policy were exhaustively added to V.
Regarding the size of the V, if a is a constant occurring in I and C a set of unary predicates A such that A(a) ∈ H, then the number of "copies" of a added by the algorithm is equal to a number of subsets of C closed under O E (see Algorithm 2). Clearly, this number is exponential in |O| and polynomial in |D| (see Definition 31).
Multi-linear, tree-shaped CQE instance. Let a DPI I = (O, D, P ) be such that O is multi-linear Datalog. Let V be a dataset returned by Algorithm 1. For every constant a, the set σ a contains the constant a A * such that A * is a maximal subset of
It is easy to check that the number of such subsets is polynomial in the size of O. The set A * is a maximal set of labels (i.e., unary predicates) among all constants in σ a , i.e., if a ∈ σ a , then {A | A(a ) ∈ V} ⊆ A * for some A * . We will also denote as a * an element of σ a such that conc V (a * ) = A * .
Let b be a constant from I and let a be from σ a such that R(a, b) is in H O E ,D . Since I is multi-linear, O does not include rules with bodies of the form R(x, y) ∧ A(x) and thus whatever unary atoms a participates in, they cannot affect the atoms b participates in. Hence we conclude that (i) if R(a , b) is in V for some a ∈ σ a and b from I, then so is R(a * , b) for a corresponding element a * from σ a ; (ii) if R(a , b ) is in V for some a ∈ σ a and b ∈ σ b , then so is R(a * , b * ) for corresponding elements a * and b * from σ a and σ b , respectively. Let V * be a subset of V which is based on constants a from I and their copies a * . Clearly if, for some CQ Q( x) , a ∈ cert(Q, O, D) and a ∈ cert(Q, O, V), then a ∈ cert(Q, O, V * ), which proves optimality of V * . The polynomial size of V * follows from the observation that the sub-routine AddUnPredicates introduces only linearly many copies of a constant a for each set of labels, including A * .
Linear, tree-shaped CQE instance. Finally, assume that O is linear. Then, there is the unique maximal subset Proof. First we show the confidentiality preservation of the censor. Since vcens V I is confidentiality-preserving, we have that
. But then, since P is tree-shaped and O is a rewriting of O we have O ∪ V |= P ( s) for each s ∈ cert(P, O, D) (see [Stefanoni et al., 2013] ), as required. Now we concentrate on the optimality of the view. Assume by contradiction that vcens V I is not optimal, then, by Proposition 30, there exists a BCQ Q such that
and since P is tree-shaped and O is a rewriting of O we have O ∪ V ∪ [Q] |= P ( s), which by the fact that V |= V then also implies that (v) O ∪ V ∪ {Q} |= P ( s) for each s ∈ cert(P, O, D). But then, (iv) and (v) and the fact that V is optimal for I we must have O ∪ V |= Q. Since V = H O ,V we have V |= Q, which contradicts (ii).
A.3 Proofs for Section 6
For the sake of ease in the proofs for theorems and propositions of this section we will consider only the class of BCQs with constants. Clearly, any results obtained for this class will also hold for the class of all CQs. Before proceeding to the main proofs, we introduce few definitions and lemmas.
Let O be a Datalog ontology and D a dataset; let Q be a possibly infinite set of queries such that O ∪ D |= Q for each Q ∈ Q . Then a censor cens Q is defined as follows:
Lemma 32. Let I = (O, D, P ) be a CQE instance; let Υ be a pseudo-obstruction based on a subset S of Q. Then, cens Υ = cens Q\S .
Proof. Let Q be a CQ such that cert(Q, O, D) = True.
Assume that cens Q\S (Q) = False; this yields that [Q] |= Q for some Q ∈ Q \ S. Then there exists Q ∈ Υ such that Q |= Q and thus [Q] |= Q , i.e., cens Υ (Q) = False.
Assume that cens Υ (Q) = False; this yields that [Q] |= Q for some Q ∈ Υ. Note that Q ∈ Q \ S since Υ ⊆ Q \ S and thus cens Q\S (Q) = False.
The lemma above allows us to speak of obstruction censors in terms of either Υ or Q \ S, whatever way is more convenient to show the required results. We are going to show now that a censor cens is optimal for a given CQE instance I iff there exists a maximal subset S of Q such that cens = cens Q\S . But first we need the following notion of a normalised proof. Definition 33. Let O be a Datalog ontology, D a dataset, and G 0 a goal. A proof π of length n of G 0 in O ∪ D is normalised if there is k ≤ n such that r i ∈ O for each i < k and r j ∈ D for each j ≥ k. Moreover, the number k is called the frontier of π, denoted fr(π).
Intuitively, a normalised proof π works as follows: first we rewrite the initial query G 0 over the ontology O until we obtain the query G fr(π)−1 that can be mapped into D, and then we perform such a mapping applying (r i , θ i ) with i ≥ fr(π). Observe that for every
We exploit the following known result about SLD resolution over Datalog ontologies. Proof. We start with the "only if"-direction. Let us assume that such maximal subset S exists. We show that cens Q\S is optimal.
First, we show that cens Q\S is confidentiality preserving. Assume the contrary; then, there is a (finite) subset F of Th cens Q\S such that O ∪ F |= P ( s) for some s ∈ cert(P, O, D). This yields the existence of proof π of
Due to Lemma 34, we can assume that π is normalised with frontier k + 1. Let G k be the goal right before frontier in π. Since π is normalised, then G k is proved by using only facts from [F] . So, we can write G k as G k = B 1 ∧. . .∧B m , where each B j is the conjunction of all atoms that are proved using facts only from a particular [Q j ]. Obviously, the order in which these B j are proved is irrelevant, so let us assume that all B j have been proved except for B i ; since, the different B j can share variables, the remaining goal to prove may not be just B i , but rather B i θ i , with θ i some substitution. We make the following observations: 
Observation 2 means that B i θ i ∈ Q for all 1 ≤ i ≤ m. Furthermore, since the censor answers True for each Q i we have that
Now we show the optimality of cens Q\S . Clearly, a censor cens for I = (O, D, P ) is optimal if and only if for each CQ Q( x) and each t ∈ cert(Q, O, D) the fact that O ∪ Th cens ∪ {Q( t)} |= P ( s) holds for each s ∈ cert(P, O, D) implies that O ∪ Th cens |= Q( t). Due to this, cens Q\S is optimal if and only if for each Q such that cert(Q, O, D) = True and O ∪ Th cens Q\S ∪ {Q} |= P ( s), it holds that O ∪ Th cens Q\S |= Q. Assume to the contrary that there exists a CQ Q such that cert(Q, O, D) = True and O ∪ Th cens Q\S ∪ {Q} |= P ( s), but O ∪ Th cens Q\S |= Q. The latter means that cens Q\S (Q) = False, that is, [Q] |= Q , for some Q ∈ Q \ S. Recall that for any Q ∈ Q \ S it holds that O ∪ S ∪ {Q} |= P ( s) due to maximality of S. Observe that S ⊆ Th cens Q\S ; this yields O ∪ Th cens Q\S ∪ {Q} |= P ( s), which contradicts the initial assumption and concludes the "only if"-direction. Now we consider the "if"-direction. Let us now assume that cens is optimal, and let Q = {Q | cens(Q) = False}. Consider the following subset S of Q: S = Q \ Q . To prove the "if"-direction, it suffices to prove the following two conditions: (i) S is a maximal subset of Q such that O ∪ S |= P ( s) for each s ∈ cert(P, O, D) and (ii) cens Q\S = cens.
To show (i) , assume that O ∪ S ∪ {Q} |= P ( s) for some s ∈ cert(P, O, D) and some Q ∈ Q. Clearly, since by construction S ⊆ Th cens , it holds that O ∪ Th cens ∪ {Q} |= P ( s), and therefore cens(Q) = False, i.e. Q ∈ Q , which implies (i).
To show (ii), let us pick an arbitrary Q such that O ∪ D |= Q but cens(Q) = False and hence Q ∈ Q . Since cens is optimal, we have that O ∪ Th cens ∪ {Q} |= P ( s) for some s ∈ cert(P, O, D), so let F be any minimal subset of Th cens such that O ∪ F ∪ {Q} |= P ( s). Following the same arguments as we used in the "only if" direction we have that there exists G ∈ Q \ S such that Q |= ∃ * G; since ∃ * G is part of the obstruction, then cens Q\S (Q) = False. Finally, assume that cens Q\S (Q) = False; then, Q |= ∃ * G for some G ∈ Q \ S. Since Q \ S ⊆ Q, we have that cens(Q) = False, as required.
Theorem 22. Let I be a Datalog CQE instance. 1. If Υ is a finite pseudo-obstruction for I, then Q∈Υ Q is an optimal obstruction for I. 2. If each pseudo-obstruction for I is infinite, then no optimal obstruction censor for I exists.
Proof. Let us prove Statement 1. Assume that Υ is a finite pseudo-obstruction. By Lemma 32, we have that cens Υ = cens Q\S . By the "only if" statement in Lemma 35, we have that cens Q\S is optimal. But then, since Υ is finite, then U is an obstruction.
Next, we show Statement 2. Assume by contradiction that each pseudo-obstruction is infinite, but there is an optimal censor based on an obstruction U . Since ocens U I is an optimal censor, then the "if" direction of Lemma 35 tells us that there exists a pseudo-obstruction Υ such that ocens U I = cens Υ . We can show that then there exists a finite pseudo-obstruction which contradicts the assumption above. Pick any CQ Q from U ; then, clearly, ocens U I (Q) = False and hence cens Υ (Q) = False. The latter implies that there exists Q ∈ Υ such that Q |= Q . Let us now construct U = Q∈U Q , which is finite and also a "subset" of Υ. To obtain a contradiction, it thus suffices to show now that ocens • Assume that ocens U I (Q) = False; then [Q] |= Q for some Q in U , and consequently, since Q ∈ Q \ S, we conclude that cens Υ (Q) = False.
The obtained contradiction concludes the proof.
Theorem 23. There is a CQE instance, which is both RL and EL, admitting an optimal view, but no optimal obstruction. Conversely, there exists an RL CQE instance that admits an optimal obstruction, but no optimal view. Proof . To show the first statement, consider I 1 = (O 1 , D 1 , P 1 ), where D 1 = {R(a, a), A(a)}, P 1 = A(a), and the guarded RL (and EL) ontology O 1 = {R(x, y) ∧ A(y) → A(x)}. Since this CQE instance is guarded and tree-shaped, by Theorem 14 we can devise an optimal view. No optimal obstruction, however, exists, which is shown in Example 20.
To show the second statement, consider CQE instance I 2 = (O 2 , D 2 , P 2 ), with D 2 = {R(a, a)}, P 2 = A(a), and O 2 = {R(x 1 , y) ∧ R(x 2 , y) → x 1 ≈ x 2 , R(x, y) → A(y) }. From [Cuenca Grau et al., 2013] we know that no optimal view exists for this instance, and the proof can be easily extended to our framework (note that our notion of a censor vcens V I based on a view V differs from the one in [Cuenca Grau et al., 2013] ) extends also to the case where views are not required to be sound. However, U = A(a) ∨ ∃x. R(x, a) is an optimal obstruction, since there is only one proof of A(a) with subgoal R(x, a).
Theorem 25. Let I = (O, D, P ) be a linear Datalog CQE instance, and let S be the set of all nodes in the proof graph of O ∪ D on the paths from facts P ( a) with any tuple of constants a to . Then, the Boolean UCQ
is an optimal obstruction computable in polynomial time, and ocens U I is the unique optimal censor for I. Proof. Optimality and uniqueness follows from Theorem 22 and the facts that (i) the set S is exactly Q (ii) the only maximal subset S of Q such that O ∪ S does not entail any P ( s) is the empty set. To prove the former fact, first observe that any goal that can appear in any SLD proof in O ∪ D is isomorphic to one of the nodes of the proof-graph of O ∪ D; then Fact (i) follows directly from the construction of the proof-graph. Fact (ii) follows from the observation that each SLD proof in case of linear O is normalised, and therefore for each Q ∈ S it holds that O ∪ Q |= P ( s) for some s ∈ cert(P, O, D).
Finally, polynomiality follows from the fact that in linear Datalog the size of the proof-graph is at most cubic in |O ∪ D|.
C Appendix (Reduction)
In this section, we show the reduction of the problem of uniform boundedness for binary Datalog to the problem of existence of optimal obstructions for Datalog CQE instances (see Section 6).
Let O be a binary Datalog ontology over a signature Σ (observe that w.l.o.g. we can assume that O is connected). Then, O is uniformly bounded if there is a constant N such that for every dataset D over Σ and for every ground atom P ( t), if the atom has a proof from O and D, then it has a proof not longer than N . It is well known that each relation P ( x) defined by O is equivalent to an infinite union of CQs Assume that O is not uniformly bounded; then, due to Property (P1), there is some Q ∈ Σ such that for any number N we have that
That is, it is not the case that for each ϕ . Hence, there is no finite pseudo-obstruction for I and therefore, due to Theorem 22, no optimal obstruction censor for I exists.
Assume that O is uniformly bounded and N is a number such that for any dataset, if a fact can proved from O and the dataset, then there is a proof of this fact not longer than N . Let T be a subset of Q \ S consisting of those Boolean CQs ∃ * G, where G is a sub-goal in some proof of P in O ∪ D of length not longer than N + 3. We claim that the UCQ U = ϕ∈T ϕ is an optimal obstruction for I. Assume that there exists a Boolean CQ ψ = ∃ * G 0 from Q \ S with G 0 a sub-goal coming from some proof of length greater than N + 3. This means that O ∪ S ∪ {ψ} |= P . Than there exists a proof π of P from O ∪ A, where A = [ψ] ∪ ϕ∈S [ϕ], of length no longer than N + 3 (1 step to apply one of the rules R S 1 (a, x 1 ) ∧ R S 2 (a, x 2 ) ∧ S(x 1 , x 2 ) → P from O , N steps to proof S(x 1 , x 2 ) using rules from O ∪ A, and 2 additional steps to proof R S 1 (a, b 1 ) ∧ R S 2 (a, b 2 ) using facts from A for some elements b 1 and b 2 ). W.l.o.g., we can assume that this proof is normalised. Recall that all the rules that are applied after the frontier are from A. We can assume w.l.o.g. that rules from [ψ] are applied only at the very end of the proof. Clearly, the goal G right before we start to apply the rules from [ψ] is such that (i) ∃ * G ∈ T and (ii) there is a homomorphism from ∃ * G to ψ. These properties imply that T is a pseudo-obstruction and, since it is finite, by Theorem 22 we have that an optimal obstruction censor for I exists.
